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This study assesses the initial economic outcomes of the Delta Regional Authority (DRA), which 
began funding rural development projects in the Mississippi Delta region in 2002. The study 
focuses on non-metropolitan DRA counties and similar counties elsewhere in the Mississippi 
Delta region and the southeast, using a quasi-experimental approach that combines matching 
methods, double difference and switching regression estimation. We find that per capita 
income and transfer payments grew more rapidly in DRA counties than similar non-DRA 
counties, and that these impacts are larger in counties in which DRA spending was larger. Each 
additional dollar of DRA spending per capita is associated with an increase of $15 in personal 
income per capita between 2002 and 2007, including an increase of $8 in earnings (primarily in 
the health care and social services sector) and $5 in transfer payments. The increase in transfer 
payments is mainly due to increased medical transfer payments.  We also find that the number 
of hospital beds per capita increased more in counties where DRA spending per capita was 
greater. These findings suggest that investments supported by the DRA in improved medical 





1.  Introduction 
Regional economic development approaches are becoming increasingly popular.  More than 30 
years after the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) was established in 1965, Congress 
authorized the Denali Commission in 1998 and the Delta Regional Authority (DRA) in 2000 to 
promote rural development in Alaska and the Mississippi Delta region, respectively.  Since 
2000, four additional regional rural development commissions have been authorized, and start-
up funds have recently been appropriated for two of these.  The popularity of this approach is 
due in part to favorable evaluations of earlier interventions such as the ARC (e.g, Isserman and 
Rephann 1995).  To date, however, there have been no published studies assessing the initial 
outcomes of the DRA or the Denali Commission, although such studies could be very helpful in 
guiding further policy decisions about such programs.  This study addresses this information 
need, investigating initial outcomes of the DRA on rural development outcomes in the 
Mississippi Delta region. 
The DRA is a partnership between the Federal Government and eight Delta states, targeting 
252 economically distressed counties.  It initiated operations in 2001 and began funding 
projects in 2002.  Between 2002 and 2008 the DRA invested $63 million in projects related to 
basic public infrastructure, business development, transportation infrastructure, job training 
and employment related education.  The program reports that it leveraged an additional $296 
million in other public investment and $1.4 billion in private investment during this period.  
In this study we investigate the initial outcomes (during 2002 to 2007) of the DRA’s investments 
in nonmetropolitan DRA counties using a quasi-experimental approach that combines matching 
methods, double difference and triple difference estimation, and switching regression models 
to reduce the confounding influences of both observable and unobservable factors and allow 
for heterogeneous impacts.  The outcome variables used in the assessment include county level 
changes in personal income per capita and its components, employment per capita and its 
components, and population.  The covariates used in the matching and regression analysis 
include prior levels of many relevant socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.  We 
investigate the robustness of our findings to alternative methods, model specifications, and 
different baseline and ending dates of the analysis.  In general, our findings are quite robust to 
these variations. 
This study is of an exploratory nature, seeking to identify whether significant differences in 
outcomes can be measured for an economic development program as small as the DRA after 
only five years of implementation.  It is not an impact evaluation, but rather a test of whether 
available data and econometric methods can discern potential impacts and help to illuminate 
the possible mechanisms of impact.  If some initial impacts are evident, this may point to useful  
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avenues of further research to better understand these impacts, and to rule out alternative 
explanations.  If no significant impacts are evident, it does not mean that the program had no 
impact; rather it may simply mean that the impacts that have occurred are not measurable with 
the data and methods available, given the relatively small size of the initial DRA funding levels, 
or that a longer time must elapse for measurable impacts to occur. 
The next section provides background on the DRA.  The third section presents the methods and 
data used in the analysis.  The results are presented and discussed in the fourth section, and 
the fifth section concludes.  
2.  The Delta Regional Authority 
The Delta Regional Authority (DRA) was authorized in December 2000 as part of the FY2001 
Omnibus Appropriations package (PL106-554) and has been reauthorized by the 2002 and 2008 
Farm Acts.  Although funding was appropriated for the DRA, the funds appropriated have been 
well below the level authorized ($30 million per year) (Table 1).  Since its inception, DRA 
expenditures have been much smaller than those of other development organizations such as 
the Economic Development Administration, the ARC, or the Denali Commission.   
The DRA is a Federal-State partnership involving eight States (Illinois, Missouri, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama).  It is led by a Federal Co-Chair and 
the Governors of the participating States.  Within these States, 252 counties and parishes are 
currently eligible for the program (Map 1).  The population of this region was 9.5 million in 
2000.  These counties were identified on the basis of economic distress, considering per capita 
income, poverty, unemployment and other indicators.    
The DRA authorizing legislation requires that at least 75 percent of the DRA funds be used to 
serve the needs of distressed counties.  DRA project funding has far exceeded this threshold, 
with 94 percent of project funding during 2002 to 2008 going to distressed counties (DRA 
2009).  This is because almost all of the eligible DRA counties are distressed.  For example, an 
Economic Research Service (ERS) analysis of the 219 counties within the original Lower 
Mississippi Delta region (excluding Alabama) found that the large majority of these counties 
were nonmetropolitan and that most were persistent poverty counties (Reeder and Calhoun 
2002).  The average poverty rate of this region in 1999 was 18.8 percent compared with 14.6 
percent for non-metro counties nationwide.  The non-metro Delta also had higher than average 
unemployment rates, a high concentration of African Americans (31 percent), per capita 
income well below the U.S. average, and a relatively low rate of population growth, particularly 
among its poorest counties. Thus, this region was economically distressed, no matter which 
measure was used.   
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The DRA is authorized to provide grants to States and public and non-profit entities for 
development projects, with the following order of priority: 1) basic public infrastructure in 
distressed or isolated areas; 2) transportation infrastructure facilitating regional economic 
development; 3) business development, with emphasis on entrepreneurship; and 4) job training 
or employment-related education.  At least 50 percent of project grant funds are required to be 
for transportation and basic public infrastructure projects.  From 2002 to 2008, 76 percent of 
DRA project funds were invested in these priority projects (Ibid.). The DRA began funding 
projects in 2002, although major project implementation did not begin until 2003.  
The DRA recognized from the outset that its ability to achieve improvements in outcomes 
would be limited by its modest budget and staff resources.  The model pursued was to 
concentrate on developing the assets needed to sustain long term growth in selected critical 
mass communities (i.e., communities and activities that have the necessary elements in place 
to successfully promote economic growth) by coordinating efforts of multiple organizations and 
leveraging additional public and private investments.   
During its first seven years of operation (2002-2008), the DRA invested $63.2 million in 435 
projects, operating in 166 of the 240 counties eligible during this period (DRA 2009).  The DRA 
reports that this investment leveraged $296.2 million in other public funds ($4.69 in additional 
public funds per $1 invested) and $1,442.3 million in private investment.  One important factor 
contributing to the potential leverage of the DRA is the fact that DRA funds can be treated as 
local counterpart funds for Federal matching grant programs, thus enabling investments that 
might not otherwise be feasible.
1 The most common type of investment supported by DRA 
funds was investment in water and/or sewer systems; these accounted for 29 percent of DRA 
project funds invested during 2002 to 2008 (Figure 1).  Following this were investments in roads 
(12 percent of project funds), industrial parks (9 percent), education and training (8 percent), 
port facilities (8 percent), medical facilities (7 percent), and business development (5 percent). 
3.  Methods and Data 
In this section we discuss the analytical methods, study population, variables and specifications 
used to estimate initial outcomes of the DRA, and the data and data sources used. 
Analytical methods 
To assess the outcomes of a program for program participants, one needs to estimate the 
counterfactual situation of what would have happened to those participants in the absence of 
the program.  Since the counterfactual is not observed, the idea is to find other non-
participating units of observation that are not affected by the program but are as similar as 
                                                           
1 Pete Johnson, DRA Federal Co-Chairman, personal communication.  
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possible to the program participants prior to the program.  This assumes that outcomes for 
units that were similar before the program are similar to outcomes that program participants 
would have experienced without the program.  The best way to identify non-participants that 
are similar to the participants, if it is feasible, is to use randomized assignment of participants in 
the program, since this assures that the distributions of all characteristics of participants and 
non-participants are statistically indistinguishable (Heckman, et al. 1998). 
Unfortunately random assignment is often not possible, as in this case.  In such situations, one 
can use quasi-experimental matching approaches that select non-participants that are similar 
to participants in terms of selected observable characteristics.  This matching method can 
reduce biases caused by differences between program participants and non-participants (or 
“treated” vs. “controls”) in these observable characteristics; i.e., this addresses the problem of 
“selection on observables” (Ibid.).  However, this does not assure that differences between the 
treated and controls in unobserved characteristics are negligible, and to the extent that such 
unobserved differences contribute to differences in outcomes, this could bias the results of the 
analysis (i.e., the problem of “selection on unobservables”). 
We address these problems by combining the use of matching methods with difference-in-
differences (DD) estimation.  The DD estimator estimates the average impact of a program on 
the participants (or average impact of the treatment on the treated (ATT)) as the difference 
between the mean outcomes for the treated and control groups after the program is 
implemented, minus the difference in outcomes before the program is implemented; i.e., (EYT1 
– EYC1) – (EYT0 – EYC0), where EYT1 and EYT0 are the mean outcomes for the treated group in 
period 1 and 0, respectively (where period 1 is during or after program implementation and 
period 0 is before implementation), and EYC1 and EYC0 are the mean outcomes for the control 
group.  This is equivalent to the change in mean outcome for the treatment group minus the 
change in mean outcome for the control group ((EYT1 – EYT0) – (EYC1 – EYC0)).  This estimator 
subtracts out the effects of any time invariant additive factors that differ between the treated 
and control groups and any common trends affecting both groups.  Thus, as long as the 
differences between the two groups are time invariant, this method eliminates bias due to 
selection on unobservables or observables (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).  
Unfortunately, the assumption that differences between the two groups are time invariant may 
fail to hold in practice.  For example, development programs may be attracted to locations 
where incomes are rising more rapidly (or more slowly) for reasons other than the program.  
One way to address this potential problem is to use the DD estimator for matched treatment 
and control groups, in which the variables used for matching are those that are expected to 
differ between the groups and to influence changes in outcomes over time (Ravallion 2008).  
This approach is similar to the conditional difference-in-differences estimator proposed by  
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Heckman, et al. (1998), which they found to be a promising method to address selection bias in 
evaluating a job training program.  Smith and Todd (2005) also found that this approach 
substantially reduced the bias in evaluating a job training program caused by time invariant 
sources of cross sectional variation, and that the advantages were robust across a range of 
matching methods and model specifications using different subsamples of the data and 
different survey instruments.  Isserman and Rephann (1995) used this approach to assess the 
impacts of the ARC, combining Mahalanobis metric matching with DD estimation of differences 
in growth rates of income, population and earnings between ARC and matched non-ARC 
counties.  Ravallion and Chen (2005) also used this approach, using propensity score matching 
to reduce observable pre-project differences between participants and non-participants in a 
development project in China, and then DD estimation for the matched sample.  
We use several alternative matching estimators combined with DD estimation.  Propensity 
score matching (PSM) has been used in many studies of impacts of social programs.  PSM 
matches participants and non-participants according to the probability of program participation 
(or “propensity score”, denoted P(X), where X includes the observable characteristics used to 
predict participation).  In the seminal study on this approach, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
proved under the assumption of “unconfoundedness” – i.e., that the outcome that would have 
occurred without the treatment (denoted as Yo) is independent of treatment status (D), 
conditional upon X – that Yo is also independent of treatment status conditional upon P(X), 
provided that 0 < P(X) < 1.
2  Under this assumption, matching on the propensity score is 
sufficient to insure that the outcomes for the matched non-participant group are statistically 
indistinguishable from the outcomes that the participants would have experienced in the 
absence of the program.   
We use PSM nearest neighbor matching (PSM-NN), with and without replacement.  Matching 
with replacement allows control observations to be used as the best match for more than one 
treated observation; hence it tends to obtain better matches with less potential bias resulting 
from imperfect matches.  However, use of fewer control observations results in larger standard 
errors and in many cases a larger mean squared error, despite less bias (Zhao 2004; Smith and 
Todd 2005).  We also use PSM with kernel matching (PSM-KM), which estimates matching 
observations based on a weighted average of observations from the non-participant pool, with 
the weights a declining function of the distance of each observation (in terms of its propensity 
                                                           
2 The assumption that 0 < P(X) < 1 ensures that there are members of the comparison group for both treated and 
untreated units of observation.  That is, if P(X) = 0 there are no treated observations for this value of X, and if P(X) = 
1, there are no control observations.  To estimate the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT), the 
assumption that P(X) > 0 is not necessary, since the requirement is only to find matches for each treated 
observation (the requirement P(X) < 1 is necessary in this case).  If instead of ATT, the average treatment effect on 
the population (ATE) is to be estimated (including the potential impact of the treatment on controls), then the 
assumption P(X) > 0 is also necessary.  
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score) from the observation in the treatment group to be matched (Heckman, et al. 1998).  
Kernel PSM is able to obtain lower standard errors than NN matching, since it uses more 
information to construct the counterfactual observations, but this may be at a cost of increased 
bias (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005).  We use the Epanechnikov kernel function and a bandwidth 
of 0.06, which are the default options in the Stata procedure used for PSM (Leuven and Sianesi 
2003).
3  To avoid observations with very high (P(X) near 1) or low (P(X) near 0) propensity 
scores, which will have poor matches, we impose a condition of “common support”, which 
drops treatment observations whose estimated propensity score is higher than the maximum 
or less than the minimum estimated propensity score of the control group (Ibid.). 
We also use the Mahalanobis metric (MM) matching estimator.  The MM estimator minimizes 
the distance function dTC = (XT – XC)
’ ∑
-1 (XT – XC), where XT and XC are vectors of matching variables 
for the treatment and potential control observations (considering all possible controls, and not 
only matched ones), and ∑ is the variance-covariance matrix of XC.  This estimator has been 
used in numerous studies of impacts of interventions in rural areas, such as the Appalachian 
Regional Commission (Isserman and Rephann 1995), prison construction (Glasmeier and 
Farrigan 2007) and rural broadband access (Stenberg, et al. 2009), among others.   
There is no theorem comparable to that of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) providing a theoretical 
justification for the MM method, and it often is more biased (in terms of differences in mean 
values of XT and XC in matched samples) than PSM, especially when a large number of 
covariates are involved (Gu and Rosenbaum 1993; Zhao 2004).  Intuitively, PSM achieves 
balance by implicitly giving greatest weight to matching on the variables that have significant 
association with the treatment assignment.  MM matching attempts to achieve balance in all 
covariates, weighted by the inverse variance matrix of the covariates, and so may overweight 
variables that have little association with the treatment assignment (and hence are of little 
concern regarding bias), especially with a large number of covariates.  Nevertheless, the MM 
estimator often has lower standard errors than the PSM estimator and in many cases lower 
mean squared error, despite being more biased (Zhao 2004).    
Another advantage of the MM estimator relative to PSM is that the estimated standard errors 
for MM are asymptotically consistent, provided that the bias resulting from imperfect matching 
on covariates is corrected (Abadie and Imbens 2006).
4  To address the bias, we use the MM 
                                                           
3 In general, results of PSM-KM are not very sensitive to the choice of the kernel function, as with non-parametric 
regression approaches (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005; DiNardo and Tobias 2001).  The choice of the bandwidth 
parameter appears to be more important, but involves a tradeoff between bias and variance – i.e., a high 
bandwidth yields a smoother density function estimation and reduced variance, but may be more biased by 
smoothing out underlying features of the actual function (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005).   
4 Abadie and Imbens (2006) proved the consistency and asymptotic normality of a class of bias-corrected covariate 
matching estimators that includes the Mahalanobis metric as a special case (Ibid., footnote 4, p. 239).    
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version of the matching estimator developed by Abadie, et al. (2004), which corrects the bias in 
estimating the ATT using a linear least squares regression of the outcome on the covariates for 
the matched control observations.
5  Abadie and Imbens (2007) showed using Monte Carlo 
simulations that their bias corrected estimator substantially reduces bias and mean squared 
error compared to matching without bias adjustment and to linear and quadratic regression 
models. This estimator is available only for nearest neighbor matching with replacement, so we 
implement it for that case only. 
For PSM, the estimated standard errors are not valid, both because of imperfect matching and 
because the estimated standard errors do not account for the fact that the propensity scores 
are estimated in a first stage estimation.  We address the bias in one version of the PSM model 
(nearest neighbor with replacement) using the bias corrected estimator of Abadie, et al. (2004).  
In this case, we use the estimated propensity score from a first stage probit model as the single 
covariate in the covariate matching algorithm.
 6 This reproduces the ATT estimated by the 
standard PSM model when no bias correction is used, although the estimated standard error is 
different.  With the bias correction, this estimator corrects for the effects of differences in 
propensity scores (but not in the individual covariates) between the treated and matched 
control observations on the estimated counterfactual outcome.   
We use bootstrapping to estimate the standard errors for all PSM estimators used (PSM-NN 
with replacement, with or without bias correction; PSM-NN without replacement, PSM-KM).  
This is standard practice among researchers to account for the fact that the propensity scores 
are estimated in a first stage estimation.  Abadie and Imbens (2008) proved that the use of 
bootstrapping is not generally valid for matching estimators, and demonstrated the 
inconsistency of the bootstrap estimator for a specific case of nearest neighbor covariate 
matching (for a scalar covariate) with replacement.  They argue that bootstrapping may be valid 
with kernel PSM estimation because the number of matches increases with sample size, but do 
                                                           
5 Formally, Abadie, et al. (2004) estimate the counterfactual outcome for each treated observation i (Yoi) as:  
Yoi = (1/#m(i)) ∑kЄm(i){Yok + μo(Xi) - μo(Xk)}, where m(i) is the set of matched control observations to treated 
observation i, #m(i) is the number of matched observations in this set, Yok is the outcome of matched control 
observation k (within m(i)), and μo(X) is the estimated linear regression function of the outcome on the covariates 
within the matched control group.  The terms μo(Xi) - μo(Xk) correct the estimated counterfactual outcome for 
differences resulting from differences in the values of the covariates between the treated (Xi) and matched control 
observations (Xk).    
6 We use a probit model to estimate propensity scores.  Other parametric probability models, such as a logit or 
linear probability model, are also commonly used, as well as non-parametric probability models.  Results of 
propensity score estimation with a binary treatment are generally not highly sensitive to the choice of probability 
model (Zhao 2004; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005).  
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not prove this.  Despite this problem, we use bootstrapping to estimate the standard errors for 
our PSM models due to lack of a suitable alternative.
7 
As we have seen, no matching method is clearly superior to all others in terms of both bias 
reduction and efficiency.  Furthermore, PSM models suffer from inconsistent estimation of the 
standard errors.  Although the MM estimator with bias correction has the advantages of being 
bias corrected and using asymptotically valid estimates of the standard errors, it generally has 
to correct for larger biases than PSM estimates, and thus can be greatly affected by the linear 
regression model used to correct for bias.  This is an important drawback, since one of the 
advantages of matching methods over parametric regression methods is that they seek to avoid 
dependence on parametric assumptions about the relationships between the covariates and 
the outcome variable.  Given these tradeoffs, we investigate the robustness of our conclusions 
to these different matching methods.  To investigate how much difference is made by the bias 
correction, we report the results of the MM estimator and the PSM-NN estimator (without 
replacement in both cases) both with and without the bias correction.  
Although the combination of matching with the DD estimator helps to control for confounding 
factors, there still could be unobserved differences between DRA and matched non-DRA 
counties that account for differences in their growth trends.  One way to test for this concern is 
to test for differences in outcome trends between treatment and control groups prior to 
implementation of the program (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).  In their study of the impacts of 
the ARC, Isserman and Rephann (1995) implemented this test, evaluating the differences in 
trends of selected outcomes during the six years prior to enactment of the program.  If the 
assumptions of the DD estimator are valid, and there are no program effects prior to program 
implementation (i.e., no effects due to anticipation of the program), the estimated pre-program 
differences in trends between program participants and non-participants should equal zero.  
We test for such pre-program differences in trends using data on the outcome indicators during 
the two years prior to implementation of the DRA, and find these to be statistically insignificant 
in most cases.    
Because there are several outcomes with significant pre-program differences in trends, we also 
estimate changes in outcome trends from before to during the DRA implementation period.  In 
these “triple difference” (DDD) models, the estimator is ((EYT1 – EYT0) – (EYC1 – EYC0))/∆t0,1 - 
                                                           
7 In a recent unpublished working paper, Abadie and Imbens (2009) derive the asymptotic standard error for the 
PSM estimator of the average treatment effect (considering nearest M neighbor matching with replacement), 
taking into account the fact that the propensity scores are estimated.  Remarkably, they find that the standard 
error is less when the propensity score is estimated, indicating that use of uncorrected standard errors will lead to 
conservative inferences when rejecting the null hypothesis (i.e., the true probability of falsely rejecting the null 
hypothesis will be less than the p-value of the test).  However, they note that this result is only for the population 
average treatment effect and need not apply to the variance of the ATT (op cit., p. 8), which is what we are 
interested in estimating.  
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((EYT0 – EYT,-1) – (EYC0 – EYC,-1))/∆t-1,0, where EYT1, EYT0, EYC1, and EYC0 are as defined earlier; EYT,-1 
and EYC,-1 are the mean outcomes for the treated and control groups during the period -1 (prior 
to period 0, with both periods 0 and -1 before program implementation); ∆t0,1 is the number of 
years between period 0 and period 1, and ∆t-1,0 the number of years between period -1 and 
period 0.  The changes in outcomes are divided by the number of years to estimate per year 
trends, since a different number of years were used to compute the trends in the pre-program 
period and the pre to during program period.  In our analysis, ∆t0,1 = 5 and ∆t-1,0 = 2 in most 
cases (except for outcome variables for which we have data only back to 2001, for which ∆t-1,0 = 
1). This form of DDD estimator has been implemented in a few other studies (McKenzie and 
Mookherjee 2003; Banerjee, Duflo and Munshi 2003). 
One important drawback of all of these estimators of program impact is that they do not 
account for the level of program investment.  These quasi-experimental methods only estimate 
mean differences in outcomes between program participants and non-participants, as if all 
participants received the same program funding.  Presumably, the impacts of a program are 
likely to be larger for participants that received more funding.  We investigated this issue using 
switching regression models for matched DRA and non-DRA counties, which also address the 
bias caused by imperfect matching and allow for heterogeneous impacts of DRA spending 
depending on the levels of other covariates.
8  The matching counties used in the switching 
regressions were based on the PSM-NN model without replacement. 
The switching regression models have the following form:
 9 
(1)     for program participants (t), and 
(2)    for nonparticipants (c). 
                                                           
8 The switching regression model was also used to test for the significance of such heterogeneous impacts, using a 
Chow test for differences in coefficients of the covariates in the regressions for DRA vs. non-DRA counties.  This 
test is the same as the parametric test for heterogeneous program impacts proposed by Crump, et al. (2008).  In 
almost all cases, this test strongly rejected the null hypothesis of homogeneous impacts; so the heterogeneous 
switching regression model was used. 
9 Note that equations (1) and (2) do not specify that the changes in outcomes (∆Y) are functions of the changes in 
covariates (∆X), as in Wooldridge (2002, p. 284), but rather as functions of pre-program values of the covariates 
(X).  The reason for this specification is the endogeneity of ∆X; i.e., changes in values of covariates, such as changes 
in population and in the economic and demographic structure of the counties studied, could be affected by the 
DRA program, potentially biasing the estimation results.  Furthermore, ∆X is not observed for all relevant 
covariates, many of which are observed only during decennial census years.  Equations (1) and (2) represent a 
reduced form specification in which the ∆X are derived as linear functions of their pre-program values X and the 
effects of the program (i.e., ∆X = f(X, P)), and these linear functions substituted into the structural linear model of 
∆Y (∆Y=g(∆X,P)=g(f(X,P),P)=h(X,P)).  It is not possible to identify the parameters of the structural model g(∆X,P) 
(and in particular the structural model impact dg/dp) based on estimation of h(X,P) without restrictive 
assumptions.  Nevertheless, the impact of P on ∆Y estimated using h(X,P) (i.e., dh/dP) is of interest in its own right, 
as the impact of the program conditional on initial conditions (but not conditional on the contemporaneous values 
of the covariates).  Our specification of equations (1) and (2) is similar to the form specified by Abadie (2005, 
equation (8)).  
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∆YTi is the change in per capita outcome Y from before to during the program for program 
participant I (i.e., YT1i – YT0i, using the notation for periods used earlier); ∆YCj is the change in per 
capita outcome Y from before to during the program for program nonparticipant j; PTi is the 
level of program investment per capita during the program period for program participant i; μp 
is the mean level of program investment per capita in the matched populations of treated and 
control units; XTi is a vector of pre-program characteristics of program participant i that 
influence ∆YTi; XCj is a vector of pre-program characteristics of program participant j that 
influence ∆YCj; μx is the mean of X in the matched populations; αT, αC, βT, γT, and γC are 
parameters to be estimated; and εTi and εCj are error terms with E(εTi)=0 and E(εCj)=0.  Although 
linear functional form restrictions are imposed in this model (unlike the simple DD-matching 
estimator model, which imposes no restrictions on the relationship between ∆Y and X), these 
regression functions allow for heterogeneous impacts of the covariates X on outcomes (i.e., γT 
and γC are not necessarily equal).  Subtracting the means of P and X ensures that the difference 
between the intercept terms in regressions (1) and (2) (αT – αC) estimates the average 
treatment effect of the program (Wooldridge (2002), p. 613).
10  In estimating these regressions, 
the population means of P and X are replaced by the sample means.
11 
Two versions of the regressions were run.  In Regression 1, the coefficient of the program level 
variable (βT) was restricted to equal zero, to mimic the approach of the matching estimators by 
accounting only for whether units are program participants, but not the level of program 
funding.  In Regression 2, βT is not restricted, but estimated.   
Study population and units of observation 
The population and units of observation for this study include nonmetropolitan DRA recipient 
counties and other nonmetropolitan counties in the eight DRA states and in three additional 
states of the southeastern United States – Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina.  These 
states were used to identify matched counties to compare to DRA recipient counties because of 
their similarities to the Delta region (especially the southern Delta region) in terms of outcome 
indicators such as income per capita and poverty, in their economic structure, and in their 
broad historical context.  Within the DRA region, DRA-eligible counties that did not receive DRA 
program funding during the time period studied (2002 to 2007) were not included as possible 
comparison counties because of concerns about spillover impacts of DRA projects on nearby 
                                                           
10 The population average treatment effect (ATE) is not the same as what is estimated by the matching - DD 
models, which were used to estimate the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT).  However, since 
the switching regression models were run for matched samples, the ATE and ATT are likely to be similar.  
Estimation of the ATT using switching regression models requires additional calculations (Wooldridge 2002). 
11 Formally, the use of sample means rather than population means affects the standard errors of the estimates, 
although this typically has a minor effect on the estimated standard errors (Wooldridge 2002, p. 613).  We do not 
correct our standard errors for this additional source of error.  
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DRA-eligible but non-recipient counties, which could make such counties a poor choice to 
represent the counterfactual non-program situation.  Concerns about selection bias are also 
greater in comparing DRA recipient to eligible non-recipient counties, since eligible non-
recipient counties may be different from recipients in important but unobserved ways, such as 
in their ability to organize to obtain and manage project funding.   
In total, there are 196 non-metro counties among the 252 DRA-eligible counties.  Of these, 133 
received DRA funds during 2002 to 2007 through various projects.  Two of these counties are 
also part of the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC).  To avoid confounding impacts of the 
DRA with impacts of the ARC, we excluded these two counties from the analysis, as well as 131 
non-DRA nonmetropolitan ARC counties from the pool of potential control counties.  The 
resulting population included 131 DRA recipient counties and 330 non-DRA eligible counties in 
the 11 states included in the study.    The common support requirement used in the matching 
eliminated 28 of the DRA recipient counties, leaving 103 DRA-recipient counties in the study 
sample.  The DRA recipient counties that failed to meet the common support requirement were 
counties having significant rice harvested area.  The per capita areas harvested of cotton and 
rice were included because of strong trends in commodity prices during the study period that 
could have affected changes in relative farm earnings in DRA vs. non-DRA counties, especially 
for rice.
12  Rice production was very limited in the study counties outside of the DRA region, so 
it was not possible to find good matches for major rice producing counties.  Hence, our findings 
cannot be interpreted as applying to all DRA counties, but rather are limited to DRA counties 
without significant rice area. 
Variables and specifications 
The outcome variables (Y) investigated include county level personal income per capita and its 
components (net earnings, current returns to assets (dividends, interest and rent), and personal 
transfer payments); employment per capita; and population.  Within earnings, impacts on total 
wages and salaries per capita were investigated.  We also investigated impacts on earnings and 
employment per capita by major industry classification for the seven largest industries in 
nonmetropolitan counties of the Delta Region (construction, manufacturing, retail, education, 
health care and social services, farming and government).
13  More than 70 percent of the adult 
population in the nonmetropolitan DRA recipient counties was employed in these industries in 
                                                           
12 In initial analysis of the data, these variables were not included among the covariates and substantial differences 
in growth of farm earnings between the treatment and control counties were found.  Inclusion of these covariates 
in the matching procedures substantially reduced these differences. 
13 Due to missing values of earnings and employment in education for many counties, however, we were not able 
to conduct the analysis for these outcome variables.  There are also many missing observations of earnings and 
employment for other industries, including construction, manufacturing, and health care and social services.  We 
report the number of observations used for these variables in the results.  
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2000, with more than 5 percent of adults employed in each (Annex Table A2).  We also 
investigated impacts on different types of transfer payments (retirement and disability, 
medical, income maintenance, unemployment insurance, veterans’ benefits, and federal 
education and training assistance).  
The covariates (X) included in the analysis include many of the same variables used in other 
studies of impacts of rural interventions on rural economic growth (e.g., Isserman and Rephann 
(1995), Stenberg, et al. (2009)), including indicators of prior outcomes (personal income per 
capita in 2000, the poverty rate in 2000, shares of personal income from asset returns and from 
transfer payments in 2001, population in 2000), economic structure (share of adults in 2000 
employed in the seven largest industries)
14, and spatial structure (distances to the nearest 
urban center of different sizes in 1980 (25,000 or more; 100,000 or more; 250,000 or more; 
500,000 or more; 1 million or more) and population density in 1990).   
Additional covariates were included in the analysis because these were also judged to possibly 
differ between DRA recipient counties and non-DRA counties, and to be potentially important 
determinants of changes in outcomes.  These covariates included indicators of the demographic 
and educational structure of the population in 2000 (rural share, farm household share, African 
American share, share age 17 or less and share age 65 or more, share of adults with more than 
a high school diploma), employment conditions in 1999 (share of men and share of women 
working full time all year), cotton and rice areas harvested per capita in 2002, Federal economic 
development grant funds received per capita during 2000-01, and whether the county was in a 
Gulf Opportunity Zone.  Federal economic development funding is a potentially important 
confounding factor, since such funds may augment or displace funds provided by the DRA.  
Failure to account for this (and other) confounding factors could have biased the conclusions of 
prior studies of the impacts of particular economic development interventions.  The dummy 
variable for Gulf Opportunity Zone counties was included to account for potential impacts of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and the effects of the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 
(KETRA) and the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (GO Zone), which provided tax incentives to 
stimulate recovery and development in the regions affected by these hurricanes.
15   
The analysis was conducted using both untransformed linear variables and a version with 
transformed variables, using changes in logarithms of the dependent variables (∆logY) and 
logarithms of continuous and positive covariates.  The results were qualitatively similar using 
                                                           
14 Unlike Isserman and Rephann (1995) and Stenberg, et al. (2009), we use shares of employment in different 
industries rather than shares of income, because of missing (undisclosed) values of earnings by industry in the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis data for many nonmetropolitan counties. 
15 Of the twelve counties most affected by flooding resulting from Hurricane Katrina, only one – Tangipahoa Parish 
in Louisiana – is a nonmetropolitan county.  Excluding this parish from the analysis had little impact on the results.  
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both approaches.  To save space and to facilitate interpretation of the results, we report only 
the results using the untransformed variables.
16 
Data 
The data on personal income and employment and their components and on population by 
county were taken from the Regional Economic Information System (REIS) of the Department of 
Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://www.bea.gov/regional/reis/).  The 
estimates of personal income and employment are based on administrative records, censuses, 
and surveys, and are designed to be consistent with state and national levels of personal 
income reported the National Income and Product Accounts.
17 For total personal income and 
employment and major components of personal income and employment, the data are 
available by county from 1969 to 2007.  For earnings and employment by industry, the data are 
only available from 2001 to 2007.  This affects the baseline year used in the analysis of pre-2002 
trends and for the DDD estimator, with a different baseline year used for earnings and 
employment by industry. 
The data on poverty rate and demographic and education characteristics of counties in 2000 
and employment conditions in 1999 were taken from the 2000 Census of Population 
(http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html).  The data on areas of cotton and rice 
harvested in 2002 were taken from the 2002 Census of Agriculture 
(http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2002/).   
The data on distances to urban centers of different sizes and population density were provided 
by Peter Stenberg, and were based on geographic information systems analysis conducted by 
researchers of the Economic Research Service as part of a study of broadband internet in rural 
areas (Stenberg, et al. 2009). 
The data on economic development grant spending in 2000 and 2001 was taken from the 
Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR) of the Census Bureau 
(http://www.census.gov/govs/cffr/). Classification of specific federal programs as rural 
economic development programs used the classification developed by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) in a recent report on federal rural economic development programs 
(GAO 2006).   This GAO report notes several problems with the data that are reported in the 
CFFR, but this is the only comprehensive source available for these programs. 
The data on DRA spending by county were taken from the DRA’s Federal Grant Program Profile 
(DRA 2009), which lists all DRA projects funded from 2002 to 2008 by year, project name, 
                                                           
16 The results using transformed variables are available from the authors upon request. 
17 See http://www.bea.gov/regional/pdf/lapi2007/lapi2007.pdf for details on the methodology used to produce 
the local area personal income and employment estimates.  
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location and approved funding amount.  Since the approved amounts of funding may not be 
spent in the same year that approval occurred, the amount of funds actually spent in each 
county during 2002 to 2007 may be less than amounts approved during this period.  Despite 
this concern, these data were judged to be more reliable than the amounts reported as DRA 
outlays in the CFFR. 
The list of GO Zone counties is taken from the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005. 
4.  Results 
Matching model results 
The probit model used to estimate propensity scores for DRA participation is shown in Annex 
Table A1, and comparisons between the covariates in the unmatched and matched samples are 
shown in Annex Tables A2 and A3.  Not surprisingly, the mean values of many of the covariates 
differ between DRA counties and non-DRA counties in the unmatched samples.  In general, DRA 
recipient counties were poorer and more dependent upon Federal spending than non-DRA 
counties in the Delta and southeast states, with a smaller share of the adult population 
employed and greater dependence on service occupations.  Such initial differences may affect 
differences in outcomes during the study period, and therefore need to be controlled for using 
econometric methods. 
Table A2 indicates that most of these mean differences in characteristics are much smaller in 
the matched samples using the propensity score – nearest neighbor matching method (PSM-
NN) with replacement.  Statistically significant differences remain in the matched samples for 
only a few variables: the share of adults employed in manufacturing (less in DRA counties), 
cotton harvested area per capita (more in DRA counties) and the elderly share of the 
population (less in DRA counties).  In all of these cases, the statistical significance is weak 
(between 5% and 10% level) and the mean differences are relatively small.  Across all 
covariates, the maximum absolute standardized bias is reduced from over 100% to 27%.
18 The 
pseudo R
2 of the probit model is much lower in the matched sample, and a likelihood ratio (LR) 
test of overall balance in the matched sample indicates that differences in the covariates are 
statistically insignificant, with a p value of 0.103.
19  Hence, this matching method performs well 
                                                           
18 The sample standardized bias for covariate X is defined as (m(Xt)-m(Xc))/square root(st
2+ scr
2), where m(Xt) and 
m(Xc) are the sample means for the treated and control groups (whether matched or unmatched), respectively; 
and st
2 and scr
2 are the sample variances for the treated group and control reservoir (unmatched controls), 
respectively (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985).  The standardized bias is divided by this denominator (rather than the 
variance of the difference in means, as in a t statistic) so that the measure is not affected by sample size and is 
comparable between different matching methods. 
19 The overall balance test is a likelihood ratio test of the joint statistical significance of all covariates in a probit 
model for program participation in the matched sample.  If the samples are well matched, the covariates should 
have a statistically insignificant impact in this model.  
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to reduce if not eliminate all differences between the DRA recipient counties and the matched 
non-DRA counties in their pre-DRA characteristics. 
Table A3 provides similar comparisons between the matched samples using the other matching 
methods investigated.
20  This matching estimator results in larger biases for some variables 
(with a maximum absolute bias of nearly 36%) and more statistically significant differences 
(compared to matching with replacement), because the constraint of non-replacement limits 
the ability to use the best matching counties more than once.  With this estimator, there are 
statistically significant differences between the DRA and matching non-DRA counties in terms of 
the poverty rate (greater in DRA counties), the share of adults employed in manufacturing 
(less), whether the county is in a GO Zone (more likely), rice harvested area per capita (greater), 
the farm share of the population (less), the child share of the population (greater), and the 
share of women working full time all year (less).  Despite having larger biases and more 
significant differences for several individual covariates, the PSM-NN estimator without 
replacement has a lower overall measure of bias, with a smaller pseudo R
2 and smaller LR test 
statistic than the PSM-NN estimator with replacement.  Hence it is not clear whether the PSM 
model with or without replacement is preferable.   
The PSM kernel matching (PSM-KM) estimator performs the best, with no statistically 
significant mean differences for any covariates, the smallest maximum bias (24%), the smallest 
pseudo R
2 and the smallest LR test statistic.  The Mahalanobis metric (MM) estimator performs 
the poorest in terms of bias, with significant differences remaining between the DRA and 
matched samples for twelve of the covariates, the largest maximum bias (nearly 62%), and the 
largest pseudo R
2 and LR test statistic (indicating statistically significant difference overall 
between the matched samples).   
These results are consistent with results of other studies that compare different matching 
methods (Gu and Rosenbaum 1993; Zhao 2004), and demonstrate that no matching method is 
clearly superior in terms of both bias reduction and efficiency.  Hence, as noted earlier, we 
report the results of several methods and investigate the robustness of our conclusions to the 
method.   
DD estimates with matching 
The results of the estimation using the DD estimator for changes in the outcome measures 
using the different matching methods are reported in Table 2.  We find that growth in per 
                                                           
20 The comparisons between unmatched samples do not vary across the matching methods, so these comparisons 
are not shown again in Table A3.  The mean levels of all covariates for the DRA counties are the same for all 
matching methods, so these are reported only once in Table A3 for comparison purposes.  The difference between 
these matching methods is in their choice of matched non-DRA counties.  
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capita personal income from 2002 to 2007 was greater in the DRA counties than in the matched 
non-DRA counties, with the difference statistically significant (at the 10% level or less) for four 
of the six matching estimators.  In all cases the mean difference was in the range of $500 to 
$660 per capita, a fairly large difference.  This difference was not statistically significant using 
either bias corrected estimator, however.  This is due mainly to larger standard errors of the 
bias corrected estimators. 
Changes in personal income per capita for the DRA recipient counties (with common support) 
and the matched non-DRA non-metro counties are shown in Maps 2 and 3 (using PSM-NN 
without replacement).  No strong geographical pattern of changes in personal income is evident 
for either group.  Comparing the cumulative distribution of changes in per capita personal 
income for DRA-recipient and non-DRA counties indicates that the distribution of income per 
capita of DRA-recipient counties stochastically dominates that of matched non-DRA counties 
(Figure 2).  Thus, it is evident that the mean difference in income growth per capita is not driven 
by outliers in these distributions.  Furthermore, comparison of these distributions suggests that 
the impact of the DRA is stronger at lower levels of income per capita, indicating a tendency 
towards more pro-poor impacts.   
Among the major components of personal income (net earnings; dividends, interest and rent; 
and transfer payments), transfer payments grew significantly more rapidly in the DRA counties, 
using four of the six estimators.  The difference in growth in transfer payments according to the 
PSM-NN estimator with replacement was not significant, in part because the standard errors 
tend to be larger for this estimator, as discussed earlier.  For all major income components the 
predicted sign of the difference was positive (i.e., greater growth in DRA counties), although the 
differences were not statistically significant except for transfer payments.   
Looking at changes in earnings per capita by industry, we find no statistically significant 
differences that are robust across the estimators (the growth in farm earnings per capita was 
greater in DRA countries and statistically significant at the 10% level using the PSM-NN 
estimator without replacement, but not significant using other estimators).  Similarly, 
differences in growth in employment per capita in total and in most major industries were not 
statistically significant and robust across estimators.  Employment per capita in farming grew 
more rapidly in DRA counties according to a few estimators (PSM-NN without replacement and 
MM-NN, with and without bias correction), but this difference was not significant using other 
estimators. 
Among the different types of transfer payments, the difference between DRA counties and 
matched non-DRA counties was largest and most robust for medical transfer payments.  The 
estimated mean differences in growth in medical transfer payments were positive and 
statistically significant for all estimators except PSM-NN with replacement.  Considering  
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different types of medical transfer payments, mean growth in Medicare payments was greater 
in DRA counties, with the difference statistically significant using four of the six matching 
estimators.  Mean growth in Medicaid, SCHIP and other state medical transfer payments was 
also greater in DRA counties in all cases, but the difference was statistically significant only for 
one of the estimators (MM, bias corrected).   
Growth in income maintenance program payments was greater in DRA counties according to 
most of the estimators.  The largest and most robust differences were for growth in food stamp 
payments.  Still, these differences were much smaller than the differences in medical transfer 
payments. 
Population growth was less (or population decline was greater) in DRA counties according to 
some estimators (PSM-NN without replacement, MM-NN with and without bias correction).  
There was no statistically significant difference between DRA counties and matched non-DRA 
counties in the change in the share of the population that is elderly, according to any of the 
estimators.  Hence, the changes in population growth or difference in growth of Medicare 
transfer payments in DRA counties does not appear to be driven by differences in growth of the 
elderly population. We find more growth in the share of the population that is African American 
in DRA counties using two of the estimators (PSM-NN without replacement in MM-NN without 
bias correction).  This could be related to the greater decline in population observed in DRA 
counties using those same estimators (i.e., greater decline in the white population), and could 
be related to differences in growth in food stamps per capita, to the extent that African 
Americans are poorer and more likely to use food stamps in the region studied.  These are not 
necessarily effects of the DRA, however, although these tendencies are more apparent in DRA-
recipient counties.   
To try to better understand the differences in medical transfer payments, we also investigated 
changes in the supply of medical staff and facilities, considering the number of doctors, nurses 
and hospital beds per capita (also reported in Table 2).  We find no statistically significant 
differences between DRA counties and matched non-DRA counties in the change in number of 
doctors or nurses per capita using any of the estimators, and insignificant differences in the 
change in number of hospital beds per capita using all but one estimator (PSM-NN without 
replacement).  These results do not explain the finding of more growth in medical transfer 
payments in DRA-recipient counties. 
Pre-DRA differences in outcome trends 
Table 3 provides estimates of the differences between DRA recipient counties and matching 
non-DRA counties in their pre-2002 outcome trends.  For most outcome variables and most 
matching estimators, there were not statistically significant differences in these pre-2002  
18 
 
outcome trends.  Here we comment on outcome variables for which there was a significant 
difference using at least one of the matching estimators.   
Pre-2002 growth in per capita personal income, net earnings, transfer payments, earnings from 
farming, total employment, government employment, and medical transfer payments was 
more rapid in the DRA recipient counties than matched non-DRA counties according to the 
uncorrected MM estimator.  However, none of these differences was significant using any of 
the other estimators.  Given the large biases noted earlier for the MM estimator and the lack of 
robustness of these results, these results are not substantial evidence of a difference in these 
trends prior to 2002. 
Considering earnings per capita by industry, we find that growth in manufacturing earnings per 
capita from 2001 to 2002 was greater in DRA recipient counties using two of the matching 
estimators (PSM-NN without replacement and PSM-KM with replacement).  Growth in earnings 
in the health care and social services industry was greater (with weak statistical significance) 
according to one estimator (MM – bias corrected).  Growth in government sector earnings was 
greater according to two estimators (MM, both uncorrected and bias corrected). 
Considering employment by industry, the pre-2002 growth in manufacturing employment was 
more rapid in DRA recipient counties according to two estimators (PSM-NN without 
replacement and MM – uncorrected), but less rapid according to the MM – bias corrected 
estimator.  Growth in employment in health care and social services was more rapid (weakly 
significant) according to the MM – bias corrected estimator. Farm employment growth was less 
rapid according to the MM – bias corrected estimator.   
Growth in income assistance program payments in total and in family assistance program 
payments was significantly greater in DRA recipient counties using all matching estimators. 
Growth in Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments and in Food Stamps was significantly 
greater according to two of the estimators (PSM-NN without replacement and MM – 
uncorrected).  Unemployment insurance payments grew less rapidly in DRA recipient counties 
(weakly significant) according to the same two estimators. 
Population grew less rapidly (or declined more rapidly) in DRA recipient counties from 2000 to 
2002 according to two of the estimators (PSM-NN without replacement and MM – 
uncorrected). 
These results indicate that there may have been differences between DRA recipient counties 
and matched non-DRA counties in outcome trends prior to implementation of the DRA for 
some outcome variables.  However, few of these differences are robust to the choice of 
estimator, with many of these seen only with the uncorrected MM estimator or the PSM-NN 
estimator without replacement.  Nevertheless, these results raise concerns about possible  
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biases in the DD estimates reported in Table 2 due to differences in prior outcome trends, 
especially for changes in family assistance program payments.  To address this concern, we 
used the DDD estimator to net out prior trends from the DD estimates. 
DDD estimates with matching 
The results of the triple difference estimation are reported in Table 4.  The results show few 
statistically significant impacts of the DRA on changes in outcome trends.  Unlike in Table 2, we 
do not find a significant impact of the DRA on growth in personal income per capita overall, and 
the impact on total transfer payments per capita is significant only using the MM-NN estimator 
with bias correction.    
As in Table 2, we find insignificant impacts on earnings and employment by industry in most 
cases.  In some industries (manufacturing, farming, and government), we find less growth in 
earnings using at least one estimator, although these results are not robust across most 
estimators.  The most robust finding for changes in earnings by industry is that earnings in 
government activities declined more in DRA recipient counties, with this difference statistically 
significant according to three of the estimators (PSM-NN with replacement and bias correction, 
PSM-KM and MM – uncorrected).  
We find that employment growth was less in DRA counties in manufacturing according to two 
of the estimators (PSM-NN without replacement and MM – uncorrected), and less in 
government according to the MM – uncorrected estimator.  By contrast, we find that growth in 
farm employment is greater in DRA recipient counties according to two estimators (both bias 
corrected PSM and MM).   
Consistent with Table 2, we find statistically significant and robust impacts of the DRA on 
Medicare payments.  Unlike Table 2, however, we find a significant and highly robust negative 
impact of the DRA on trends in family assistance payments, with greater decline in such 
payments in DRA counties compared to matched non-DRA counties, after subtracting prior 
trends.  Growth in unemployment insurance payments was greater (weakly significant) in DRA 
recipient counties according to two of the matching estimators (PSM-NN without replacement 
and MM – uncorrected), and growth in veterans benefits was greater according to the PSM-KM 
estimator only. 
The association of DRA counties with population decline observed using some matching 
estimators in Table 2 is not found using the DDD estimator.  Indeed, DRA counties are 
associated with more increase in population growth using some of the matching estimators 
with the DDD estimation.  Hence, differences in prior population growth trends account for the 
apparent negative impact of the DRA on population growth reported in Table 2, rather than an 
actual negative impact.   
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These results suggest that differences in prior trends (and the unmeasured factors responsible 
for them) do not account for differences in trends during the DRA implementation period for 
most outcome variables.  Exceptions include family assistance program payments, which were 
growing more rapidly in DRA counties prior to DRA implementation but did not do so 
afterward; and population, which was growing more slowly in DRA counties prior to DRA 
implementation according to some estimators, but which grew more rapidly during DRA 
implementation after subtracting the prior trend.  For these exceptions, the DRA may have 
caused a change in prior trends, reducing the prior growth in family assistance payments but 
increasing population growth.  For other variables, there is less evidence that any differences 
observed during the DRA implementation period were due to prior trends.  In particular, the 
robust finding that medical transfer payments grew more rapidly in DRA counties between 
2002 and 2007 cannot be explained as a continuation of a prior difference in trends. 
Switching regression estimates with matched sample 
The results of Regression 1 are similar to those of the matching estimators reported in Table 2 
(Table 5).  Personal income per capita grew more rapidly in DRA counties (by about $518 per 
capita on average), as did personal transfer payments per capita (both strongly significant) and 
net earnings per capita (weakly significant).  There are few significant differences in earnings 
per capita by industry (except a weakly significant result for farm earnings, which grew faster in 
DRA recipient counties, and government earnings, which grew more slowly in DRA counties).  
There are no significant differences in total employment per capita or employment by industry.  
As with the matching analysis, we find significant differences in transfer payments per capita, 
especially medical transfer payments, but also including retirement and disability payments, 
Food Stamps and veterans benefits.  Also consistent with the matching analysis, we find 
evidence of slower population growth (or more population decline) in DRA counties using 
Regression 1. 
In Regression 2, we find that several outcomes are associated with greater DRA spending, 
controlling for whether or not the county is a DRA county.  Personal income per capita grew 
significantly more in counties with more DRA spending per capita, with each $1 of additional 
DRA spending per capita associated with $15 of additional growth in personal income per 
capita.  This suggests that DRA spending is having a strong impact on personal income growth, 
well beyond the simple amount of funds transferred, indicating that other funds are being 
leveraged and/or that economic growth is being stimulated.  The results for net earnings 
(almost $8 of additional net earnings growth per $1 of DRA spending per capita) and wages and 
salaries (almost $12 per capita of additional wages and salaries for each additional $1 of DRA 
spending per capita) suggest that DRA spending is having a strong marginal impact on economic 
activity, and is not only having an effect by leveraging transfer payments.    
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Across major industries, we find a significant impact of additional DRA spending only for the 
health care and social services sector, with each $1 of additional spending associated with more 
than $8 of additional earnings.
21  These impacts were apparently masked in the matching 
analysis, which failed to account for differences in the level of DRA spending.   
Although the impacts of the DRA apparently go beyond transfer payments, DRA spending is also 
having a strong impact on transfer payments, with each additional $1 of DRA spending 
associated with $5 of additional transfer payments.  The additional transfer payments are 
mainly medical transfers ($2.49 per $1 of additional DRA spending) and retirement and 
disability benefits ($1.67 per $1 of additional DRA spending).  These findings suggest that DRA 
spending leverages other forms of government spending.  In the case of medical transfer 
payments, this is likely due to DRA investments in medical facilities, which is one of the major 
components of the DRA projects that have been funded.  This is consistent with the fact that 
the health care sector is the only one found to have greater earnings as a result of greater DRA 
spending, and suggests that a major near term impact of the DRA has been to promote health 
sector earnings and transfer payments through investments in medical facilities.  This is also 
supported by the fact that the number of hospital beds per capita has grown more in counties 
where DRA spending was greater (also reported in Table 5).   
Controlling for the level of DRA spending per capita, as in Regression 2, the coefficient of the 
DRA county dummy reflects differences in outcome trends between DRA counties and matched 
non-DRA counties that are not due to DRA funding levels.  Such differences could be due to the 
fact that the DRA is operating in DRA counties, regardless of funding levels (e.g., as a result of 
improved organizational capacity in DRA counties), though it may also reflect unmeasured 
differences between DRA-recipient and matched non-DRA counties.    
Robustness of results to different baseline and ending years 
We investigated the robustness of the matching DD estimation and regression results to 
different baseline and ending years, considering 2001 as an alternative base year and 2005 and 
2006 as alternative ending years for the estimations.
22  We chose 2002 as the baseline (pre-
project implementation) year in the analysis because DRA outlays were minimal in 2002, as 
shown in Table 1.  Nevertheless, we consider 2001 as an alternative baseline year, given that 
some program impacts may have begun to occur in 2002. 
                                                           
21 The results for the health and social services sector are based on a constrained regression (with equal 
coefficients of the covariates for both DRA and non-DRA counties), because of a small sample size due to data 
suppression for earnings in this sector.  Given the small sample size, we have less confidence in the results for this 
sector than for others. 
22 These results are not reported to save space, but are available upon request from the authors.  
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The results were qualitatively very similar and in some cases more robust across estimators 
when using 2001 as the base year or 2006 as the ending year.   All of the matching and 
regression estimators with DD showed statistically significant greater growth in personal 
income per capita in DRA recipient counties when 2001 was taken as a base year, and most 
estimators showed greater growth from 2002 to 2006, with all of the estimated impacts of the 
same order of magnitude as those shown in Tables 2 and 5.   Differences in earnings growth by 
industry were again statistically insignificant in almost all cases, except for farm earnings, which 
grew more from 2001 to 2007 and from 2002 to 2006 in DRA recipient counties according to 
most of the estimators.  The growth in transfer payments during these periods was greater in 
DRA counties according to almost all estimators and was greater where DRA spending was 
greater, as in Tables 2 and 5.  The difference in growth in transfer payments in DRA counties 
from 2001 to 2007 and from 2002 to 2006 is mostly due to greater growth in medical transfer 
payments, as in Tables 2 and 5, although there are differences in growth of other transfer 
payments as well, particularly in food stamps.  Also as in those tables, there are few statistically 
significant differences across estimators in changes in returns to assets, or in employment per 
capita in total or by industry.  And the estimated population change was smaller in DRA 
counties according to some of the estimators (the same ones showing significant negative 
coefficients in Tables 2 and 5). 
Considering 2005 rather than 2006 or 2007 as the ending year, the differences in growth of 
total personal income per capita were no longer statistically significant, although transfer 
payments grew more rapidly in DRA counties during this period according to most of the 
estimators.  It appears that earnings and overall income growth responded more slowly to DRA 
investments than transfer payments.  As when using other starting and ending years, 
differences in growth of medical transfer payments was the major source of difference 
between DRA and matching non-DRA counties.  Differences in other outcomes were also 
qualitatively similar to the differences observed for 2006 or 2007 as the ending year.  
These results give us confidence that the results reported in Tables 2 and 5 are not statistical 
artifacts evident only in one particular time period, but are robust to alternative specifications 
of the starting and ending year used for the comparisons.   They also suggest that the impacts 
of DRA investments on broader measures of economic growth, such as on earnings and total 
personal income per capita, take longer to become evident than the impacts on government 
transfer payments. 
Summary 
Overall, the matching and regression results suggest that the DRA is having a positive impact on 
growth in personal income per capita in DRA counties by increasing transfer payments, 
especially medical transfer payments.  Total earnings and employment per capita did not  
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increase measurably more on average in DRA counties, but among DRA counties, earnings 
increased more in counties where DRA spending per capita was greater.  The evidence suggests 
that earnings increased mainly in the health care and social service sector in counties with 
higher DRA spending per capita.  The DRA has had unclear impacts on changes in population.  
Although some estimators suggest that population declined more in DRA counties, the evidence 
showed that this trend existed before the DRA was implemented, and a positive impact on 
population growth is indicated by those same estimators when the prior population trends are 
subtracted out.  The evidence also suggests that it takes longer for some impacts than others to 
be observed; e.g., the impacts on transfer payments are evident earlier than impacts on 
earnings and total personal income per capita. 
5.   Conclusions 
The results of this analysis suggest that even though the DRA is a relatively small program and 
its impacts could only be investigated during its first five years of implementation, the program 
has had measurable positive impacts on some outcomes, including per capita personal income 
and transfer payments.  These impacts were larger in counties where DRA spending per capita 
was greater, with each $1 of additional DRA spending associated with an additional $15 in 
personal income per capita, including $8 in additional earnings in the health care and social 
service sector and $5 in additional transfer payments – mainly due to additional medical 
transfer payments.  The effect of higher DRA spending on health sector earnings and medical 
transfer payments is consistent with the fact that spending on medical facilities is one of the 
highest priority areas of DRA spending, and with the fact that the number of hospital beds per 
capita has grown more rapidly in counties with more DRA spending per capita.  
The fact that we do not find measurable impacts of the DRA so far on other outcome indicators, 
such as on earnings per capita in most industries or on employment per capita, does not mean 
that there have not been any such impacts or will not be in the future.  Given the relatively 
small amount spent by the DRA in DRA recipient counties so far and the time required for 
investments in infrastructure to affect economic growth, it is not surprising that it is difficult to 
detect impacts after only five years of program implementation.  Furthermore, some of the 
largest investments made by the DRA have been in community facilities such as improved 
water and sewer systems, which improve the quality of life but may have little direct near-term 
impact on employment or income, although they may promote community economic 
development in the longer term by attracting new residents and industries and reducing 
outmigration.   
It is perhaps more surprising to find such large incremental impacts of DRA spending on 
personal income, earnings and transfer payments.  The results suggest that these impacts are 
not simply the direct result of DRA funds circulating in the local economies of the Delta Region,  
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since the multipliers are far larger than those typically estimated for spending in rural areas.   
Rather, it appears that DRA spending on medical facilities is leveraging additional resources 
through medical programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, and that these are contributing to 
increased earnings in the health care and social service sector. 
The estimated impacts of the DRA on income in the health care sector raise the general 
question of the potential for investments in that sector to contribute to sustainable economic 
development in rural areas.  Ours is not the first study to notice the potential economic impacts 
of health sector investments in rural areas of the United States.  There is a growing body of 
literature on such impacts, led by researchers at National Center for Rural Health Works at 
Oklahoma State University and other research centers (e.g., Doeksen, et al. 1998; Doeksen and 
Schott 2003; St. Clair, Doeksen and Schott 2007; St. Clair and Doeksen 2009).  However, most of 
that literature estimates impacts using an economic input-output model, without being 
validated by empirical ex-post estimates of the impacts of actual investments. The present 
study is the only one that we are aware of that estimates such impacts using quasi-
experimental and other econometric methods with county level income data.  Although we did 
not start out specifically hypothesizing impacts of the DRA on income in the health sector, the 
fact that we found such impacts suggests that further research on the impacts of this type of 
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DRA  DRA  EDA  ARC
25  Denali 
Commission 
1999  -  -  355  136  1 
2000  -  -  356  125  38 
2001  20.0  -  356  86  11 
2002  10.0  1  355  101  -14
26 
2003  7.9  6  375  74  2 
2004  5.0  12  337  68  16 
2005  6.0  9  332  65  49 
2006  11.9  6  284  63  42 
2007  11.9  8  243  67  33 
2008  11.7  8  238  69  46 
2009  13.0  9  243  62  60 
2010
27  13.0  13  422  65  79 
 
 
                                                           
23 Source:  Annual appropriations bills, various years. 
24 Source:  Table 12.3, Historical Tables from the President’s Budget, FY2011.  Available at: 
(www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/).  
25 Excludes Appalachian Highway Program. 
26 Negative number due to de-obligated funds. 
27 Figures for 2010 are estimates.  
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Table 2.  Mean changes in outcomes, 2002 to 2007, DRA minus matching counties (DD estimator) (standard errors in parentheses) 
 


































Major components of personal income             
















































Earnings per capita by industry             













































































































Employment per capita by industry             








































































Transfer payments by type             




































































































































































































































*, **, *** Difference statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.  Mean changes in outcomes, 2000 or 2001 to 2002, DRA minus matching counties
28 
 


































Major components of personal income             




































Major components of earnings             












Earnings per capita by industry             




























































- Government  38.7  46.3  2.1  24.8  49.1***  31.5* 
                                                           
28 Changes from 2001 to 2002 for earnings and employment per capita by industry; all other changes are from 2000 to 2002.  
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(38.9)  (41.0)  (21.8)  (26.0)  (17.8)  (17.9) 












Employment per capita by industry             








































































Transfer payments by type             











































































































































































*, **, *** Difference statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4.  Mean changes in trends, 2002 to 2007 minus 2000 to 2001 or 2002, DRA minus matching counties (DDD estimator)
29 
 


































Major components of personal income             
















































Earnings per capita by industry             








































































                                                           
29 Changes from 2001 to 2002 are subtracted for earnings and employment per capita by industry; all other subtracted changes are from 2000 to 2002.  
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Employment per capita by industry             
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Table 5.  Average treatment effects based on switching regressions for changes in outcomes, 2002 to 
2007, DRA and matching counties (using PSM-NN without replacement) (N=206, except where noted) 
 
Dependent variable  Regression 1  Regression 2 
DRA recipient  DRA recipient  DRA funds per cap. 






Major components of personal income       
























Earnings per capita by industry       


















- Health care and social services (N=52)
























Employment per capita by industry       































                                                           
30 Regressions for earnings in health care and social services assume equal coefficients of covariates in treated and 




Dependent variable  Regression 1  Regression 2 
DRA recipient  DRA recipient  DRA funds per cap. 
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Figure 1.  Allocation of DRA project funds, 2002-2008 
 
 




















Figure 2.  Cumulative density functions of change in personal income per capita, 2002 to 2007 





Map 1.  DRA – eligible counties 
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Map 3.   Change in personal income per capita in matched non-metro non-DRA counties, 2002-
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Table A1.  Probit model to estimate propensity scores
a 
Explanatory variable  Coefficient  Std. Err.  P>z 
Personal income per capita, 2000 ($)  -6.42E-05  6.86E-05  0.349 
Population, 2000  -2.83E-06  7.46E-06  0.705 
Poverty rate, 2000 (%)  0.0793  0.0523  0.130 
Share of personal income from personal transfer payments, 2001  -4.812  4.160  0.247 
Share of personal income from dividends, interest and rent, 2001  -11.516  4.253  0.007*** 
Share of adults employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing or 
hunting, 2000  -16.331  5.577  0.003*** 
Share of adults employed in construction, 2000  -9.235  5.355  0.085* 
Share of adults employed in manufacturing, 2000  -0.081  2.393  0.973 
Share of adults employed in retail trade, 2000  -4.090  6.531  0.531 
Share of adults employed in public administration, 2000  -5.696  5.637  0.312 
Share of adults employed in educational services, 2000  -8.233  4.959  0.097* 
Share of adults employed in health care or social services, 2000  8.406  4.734  0.076* 
Federal economic development grant funds per capita, 2000-01  0.000234  0.000177  0.188 
Gulf Opportunity Zone counties  1.018  0.320  0.001*** 
Cotton harvested acres per capita, 2002  0.249  0.102  0.014** 
Rice harvested acres per capita, 2002  4.216  1.378  0.002*** 
Distance to nearest urban center of 25,000 or more, 1980  -0.003047  0.003676  0.407 
Distance to nearest urban center of 100,000 or more, 1980  0.000397  0.001844  0.829 
Distance to nearest urban center of 250,000 or more, 1980  0.001372  0.001222  0.262 
Distance to nearest urban center of 500,000 or more, 1980  -0.000379  0.000844  0.654 
Distance to nearest urban center of 1,000,000 or more, 1980  -0.000556  0.000511  0.277 
Population density, 1990 (persons/sq. mile)  -0.000158  0.004383  0.971 
Rural share of population, 2000  -0.9866  0.5895  0.094* 
Farm share of population, 2000  0.7628  4.3035  0.859 
Black share of population, 2000  -0.9836  0.8337  0.238 
Share of population age 17 or less, 2000  -11.078  5.619  0.049** 
Share of population age 65 or more, 2000  4.097  6.605  0.535 
Share of adults with more than a high school education, 2000  -0.195  2.223  0.930 
Share of men working full time all year, 2000  1.831  2.916  0.530 
Share of women working full time all year, 2000  -18.584  3.572  0.000*** 
a Number of observations = 461.  Pseudo R
2 = 0.4293.   
*, **, *** Coefficient statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table A2.  Comparison of characteristics of unmatched and matched DRA and comparison samples, 
using PSM-NN matching with replacement 
 
Variable  Sample 
Mean 
%bias  p>|t|  Treated  Control 
Personal income per capita, 2000 ($) 
 
Unmatched  18755  20703  -70.3  0.000*** 
Matched  19147  19139  0.3  0.981 
Population, 2000 
 
Unmatched  23876  26265  -12.4  0.273 
Matched  24483  26102  -8.4  0.559 
Poverty rate, 2000 (%) 
 
Unmatched  19.96  15.63  81.8  0.000*** 
Matched  19.02  18.20  15.6  0.212 
Share of personal income from personal 
transfer payments, 2001 
Unmatched  0.2681  0.2277  83.3  0.000*** 
Matched  0.2616  0.2620  -0.9  0.951 
Share of personal income from dividends, 
interest and rent, 2001 
Unmatched  0.1659  0.1839  -51.9  0.000*** 
Matched  0.1702  0.1674  8.2  0.458 
Share of adults employed in agriculture, 
forestry, fishing or hunting, 2000 
Unmatched  0.0568  0.0540  7.8  0.446 
Matched  0.0484  0.0481  0.8  0.943 
Share of adults employed in construction, 
2000 
Unmatched  0.0720  0.0775  -26.7  0.011** 
Matched  0.0750  0.0726  11.5  0.408 
Share of adults employed in 
manufacturing, 2000 
Unmatched  0.1978  0.2225  -33.0  0.001*** 
Matched  0.1990  0.2180  -25.4  0.069* 
Share of adults employed in retail trade, 
2000 
Unmatched  0.1141  0.1136  3.3  0.757 
Matched  0.1149  0.1152  -1.4  0.925 
Share of adults employed in public 
administration, 2000 
Unmatched  0.0559  0.0527  13.4  0.200 
Matched  0.0542  0.0496  19.3  0.120 
Share of adults employed in educational 
services, 2000 
Unmatched  0.0926  0.0835  33.2  0.001*** 
Matched  0.0927  0.0891  12.9  0.386 
Share of adults employed in health care or 
social services, 2000 
Unmatched  0.1156  0.1077  31.5  0.002*** 
Matched  0.1167  0.1165  0.9  0.953 
Federal economic development grant 
funds per capita, 2000-01 ($)  
Unmatched  367.21  285.78  17.6  0.097* 
Matched  336.88  304.91  6.9  0.538 
Gulf Opportunity Zone counties (share of 
counties) 
Unmatched  0.1832  0.0394  46.8  0.000*** 
Matched  0.2233  0.3010  -25.3  0.207 
Cotton harvested acres per capita, 2002 
 
Unmatched  0.9494  0.3330  43.1  0.000*** 
Matched  0.5409  0.2451  20.7  0.079* 
Rice harvested acres per capita, 2002 
 
Unmatched  0.5834  0.0017  57.8  0.000*** 
Matched  0.0430  0.0282  1.5  0.395 
Distance to the nearest urban center of 
25,000 or more, 1980 (miles) 
Unmatched  37.28  35.03  8.4  0.424 
Matched  37.04  38.22  -4.4  0.737 
Distance to the nearest urban center of  Unmatched  85.43  82.53  5.3  0.611  
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Variable  Sample 
Mean 
%bias  p>|t|  Treated  Control 
100,000 or more, 1980 (miles)  Matched  85.72  86.25  -1.0  0.943 
Distance to the nearest urban center of 
250,000 or more, 1980 (miles) 
Unmatched  149.04  139.37  11.1  0.290 
Matched  146.89  157.16  -11.8  0.380 
Distance to the nearest urban center of 
500,000 or more, 1980 (miles) 
Unmatched  236.17  225.97  7.1  0.503 
Matched  235.90  244.16  -5.8  0.682 
Distance to the nearest urban center of 
1,000,000 or more, 1980 (miles) 
Unmatched  377.79  397.67  -9.9  0.358 
Matched  371.46  395.03  -11.8  0.398 
Population density, 1990 (persons/square 
mile) 
Unmatched  40.29  46.06  -17.3  0.103 
Matched  42.61  41.19  4.3  0.738 
Rural share of population, 2000 
 
Unmatched  0.6785  0.7066  -12.3  0.222 
Matched  0.7070  0.7452  -16.7  0.256 
Farm share of population, 2000 
 
Unmatched  0.0317  0.0501  -54.1  0.000*** 
Matched  0.0341  0.0381  -11.7  0.296 
Black share of population, 2000 
 
Unmatched  0.2805  0.1868  43.3  0.000*** 
Matched  0.2590  0.2524  3.1  0.828 
Share of population age 17 or less, 2000 
 
Unmatched  0.2583  0.2505  29.3  0.002*** 
Matched  0.2546  0.2511  13.0  0.345 
Share of population age 65 or more, 2000 
 
Unmatched  0.1495  0.1520  -9.2  0.398 
Matched  0.1504  0.1577  -27.4  0.053* 
Share of adults with more than a high 
school education, 2000 
Unmatched  0.3269  0.3490  -30.6  0.004*** 
Matched  0.3370  0.3301  9.5  0.508 
Share of men working full time all year, 
2000 
Unmatched  0.5732  0.6144  -71.4  0.000*** 
Matched  0.5764  0.5778  -2.5  0.860 
Share of women working full time all year, 
2000 
Unmatched  0.3937  0.4308  -102.7  0.000*** 






2  LR chi
2  p>chi
2 
  Unmatched  0.429  236.26  0.000*** 
  Matched  0.140  40.12  0.103 
*, **, *** Difference statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A3.  Comparison of characteristics of matched DRA and comparison samples, using PSM-NN matching without replacement, PSM-KM and 






replacement  PSM-KM  Mahalanobis 
Control  %bias  p>|t|  Control  %bias  p>|t|  Control  %bias  p>|t| 
Personal income per capita, 2000 ($)  19147  19385  -8.6  0.512  19205  -2.1  0.876  19865  -25.9  0.036** 
Population, 2000  24483  23345  5.9  0.655  26026  -8.0  0.542  28348  -20.0  0.069* 
Poverty rate, 2000 (%)  19.02  17.56  27.6  0.035**  18.07  18.0  0.160  16.46  48.3  0.000*** 
Share of personal income from personal 
transfer payments, 2001  0.2616  0.2536  16.5  0.250  0.2585  6.5  0.650  0.2372  50.3  0.000*** 
Share of personal income from dividends, 
interest and rent, 2001  0.1702  0.1708  -1.7  0.884  0.1673  8.4  0.473  0.1683  5.5  0.629 
Share of adults employed in agriculture, 
forestry, fishing or hunting, 2000  0.0484  0.0496  -3.4  0.757  0.0456  7.9  0.462  0.0464  5.6  0.589 
Share of adults employed in construction, 2000  0.0750  0.0752  -1.1  0.937  0.0763  -6.2  0.657  0.0762  -6.2  0.628 
Share of adults employed in manufacturing, 
2000  0.1990  0.2202  -28.3  0.040**  0.2113  -16.4  0.235  0.2388  -53.1  0.000*** 
Share of adults employed in retail trade, 2000  0.1149  0.1134  9.2  0.523  0.1139  6.3  0.671  0.1145  2.3  0.843 
Share of adults employed in public 
administration, 2000  0.0542  0.0518  10.4  0.433  0.0523  8.3  0.523  0.0460  34.4  0.004*** 
Share of adults employed in educational 
services, 2000  0.0927  0.0901  9.5  0.557  0.0888  14.1  0.329  0.0865  22.2  0.140 
Share of adults employed in health care or 
social services, 2000  0.1167  0.1139  11.4  0.414  0.1171  -1.6  0.911  0.1058  43.6  0.001*** 
Federal economic development grant funds per 
capita, 2000-01 ($)  336.88  298.61  8.3  0.479  281.99  11.9  0.313  287.84  10.6  0.275 
Gulf Opportunity Zone counties  0.2233  0.1262  31.6  0.067*  0.2976  -24.2  0.226  0.2039  6.3  0.735 
Cotton harvested acres per capita, 2002  0.5409  0.3899  10.5  0.406  0.3181  15.6  0.197  0.2558  19.9  0.116 
Rice harvested acres per capita, 2002  0.0430  0.0048  3.8  0.007***  0.0239  1.9  0.257  0.0236  1.9  0.249 
Distance to the nearest urban center of 25,000 







replacement  PSM-KM  Mahalanobis 
Control  %bias  p>|t|  Control  %bias  p>|t|  Control  %bias  p>|t| 
Distance to the nearest urban center of 
100,000 or more, 1980 (miles)  85.72  76.31  17.2  0.209  87.50  -3.3  0.814  84.62  2.0  0.878 
Distance to the nearest urban center of 
250,000 or more, 1980 (miles)  146.89  147.20  -0.4  0.980  154.10  -8.3  0.557  136.83  11.6  0.361 
Distance to the nearest urban center of 
500,000 or more, 1980 (miles)  235.90  220.83  10.5  0.447  238.68  -1.9  0.892  210.46  17.8  0.202 
Distance to the nearest urban center of 
1,000,000 or more, 1980 (miles)  371.46  362.64  4.4  0.745  383.39  -6.0  0.666  316.47  27.5  0.020** 
Population density, 1990 (persons/sq. mile)  42.61  38.48  12.4  0.295  41.83  2.4  0.854  43.48  -2.6  0.838 
Rural share of population, 2000  0.7070  0.7187  -5.2  0.721  0.7372  -13.2  0.356  0.6974  4.2  0.753 
Farm share of population, 2000  0.0341  0.0416  -22.1  0.047**  0.0336  1.5  0.882  0.0399  -17.0  0.067* 
Black share of population, 2000  0.2590  0.2118  21.9  0.132  0.2301  13.4  0.338  0.1995  27.5  0.039** 
Share of population age 17 or less, 2000  0.2546  0.2484  23.5  0.097*  0.2523  8.5  0.547  0.2525  7.7  0.584 
Share of population age 65 or more, 2000  0.1504  0.1549  -16.9  0.210  0.1531  -10.0  0.464  0.1485  7.4  0.524 
Share of adults with more than a high school 
education, 2000  0.3370  0.3343  3.7  0.798  0.3383  -1.8  0.897  0.3389  -2.8  0.836 
Share of men working full time all year, 2000  0.5764  0.5870  -18.3  0.198  0.5827  -10.9  0.444  0.6112  -60.3  0.000*** 
Share of women working full time all year, 
2000  0.3915  0.4044  -35.8  0.010***  0.3922  -2.1  0.886  0.4137  -61.7  0.000*** 
 






















0.097  27.65  0.589  0.047  13.33  0.996  0.218  62.29  0.000*** 
*, **, *** Difference statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 